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Towards a Sensible Semiotics 
PETER GODFREY-SMITH* 
I - Introduction 
The structuralist movement thought that many diverse aspects of social 
life could best be understood by viewing these phenomena as comprising 
certain kinds of systems. I will call these systems aUlonomous differential 
systems. (This term will be explained shortly). The first type of social 
phenomenon to be analysed as an autonomous differential system was 
natural language. originally by Ferdinand de Saussure. His methodology 
came to dominate twentieth century linguistics. and later many other 
phenomena came to be analysed as autonomous differential systems. 
including myth. fashion. food. music. films. kinship systems. and literary 
works. Structuralist methods also guided economics. sociology. and other 
social sciences. For sometime everywhere we looked there were autonomous 
differential systems. Today. however. people are much more wary. 
Instead. we are urged to de-construct our thinking. We live in the age of 
post-structuralism. 
The thesis of this essay is that a considerable amount of what the 
original structuralists said was true. There are a fair number of 
autonomous differential systems. or interesting approximations to them. 
in the world. There are social phenomena. including aspects of language. 
structured very much as Saussure and his successors thought. Further. 
facts about the structures of these systems are perfectly objective and open 
to scientific scrutiny. However. the structuralists made many mistakes too. 
They should never have seen their ideas as having direct metaphysical 
consequences. for instance. They also went wrong on a central matter: 
many aspects. especially the central communicative aspects. of natural 
language don't comprise autonomous differential systems. Language is. 
for the most part. a dilTerent sort of system. The much-maligned 'naming' 
approach to the semantics of natural language is correct. 
The following section explores the idea of an au~onomous differential 
system and looks at simple examples. Section 1Il takes on a more 
complex case. in more detail - low-level analysis of music. Section IV 
considers. in the manner of Section II. some systems which aren't 
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autonomous ditlerential systems. This introduces Section Y, which 
argues that language is also a different kind of system. These arguments 
are not supposed to attack many of the central guiding ideas of 
structuralism. There are even ways of moditying parts of the structuralist 
corpus to take care of some of the problems I raise. The essay ends 
(Section VI) with a discussion of these. 
II - Systems 
Structuralists and semioticians are famous for their fascination with 
systems. The system-seeking strategy is a simple idea - that some things 
operate in our lives not as independent things, but in groups of 
interrelated things. There is an immediate problem. of course; anything 
can be related to anything, if we choose to look at it that way. We could 
devise a ·system'. that included Cicero and Australia II as its elements, if we 
chose. But this would be a particularly uninteresting and second-rate 
system, because the strategy of viewing its elements as linked has no 
explanatory power. We should not posit structure gratuitously, only where 
It helps us to discern a pattern. to fonnulate the laws governing otherwise 
incomprehensible phenomena. Modem critics accuse the structuralist 
enterprise of vacuity, on the grounds that one can find structure anywhere 
if one looks hard enough. The right general reply to this is the 
methodological principle just expressed. Indeed there are systems 
anywhere you look. but only the ones with explanatory power are 
respectable. The problem. of course. is to tell real explanatory power from 
bogus - the problem is more relocated than solved. But progress has been 
made in such a relocation. The problem about explanation is one we had 
already. 
The idea that many diverse aspects of social life are systematic has 
taken us part of the way to the structuralist idea. The next important idea 
is that of an (explanatorily) autonomous system. An autonomous system 
is one that is self-contained .. or. to use Piaget's word. 'self-regulating' I. The 
system is governed entirely by its own structural laws. principles which 
make no refernce to items outside the system. Some claritication is 
needed at this point. No structuralist. or at least no sensible one. would 
deny that there are some links between elements of systems like language 
and music. and things outside the system: for it is part of the structuralist 
programme to investigate how systems like language alfect extra-systemic 
things like political and economic life. There are no real autonomous 
I. 1. Piaget Srtll(,flIl"lIlil1l/. London. 1971.5-16. T. Hawkes. Srtll('/llIydil1ll (/1It! S{,lIIiori('\. London. 
1977. p.16. 
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systems in society if autonomous means causally isolated. or some such 
notion. 
What must be meant by autonomous is something narrower. Systems 
are explanatorily autonomous if understanding how they usually and 
normally operate - under assumptions about the context of the system -
involves only knowledge of internal structural laws. Perhaps the right way 
to express it (suggested to me by Fiona Cowie) is to say that external 
factors affect which system is manifested. and how the system affects 
other aspects of our lives. but the functioning of the system itself is 
autonomous. 
A good first illustration is the notion of a formal system. as understood 
in logic. mathematics, and computer science. A formal system is simply a 
set of symbols and a set of rules which prescribe how to get from one 
string of symbols to another. These systems can have all sorts of physical 
realizations; they can exist on paper (in many different notations). in the 
circuits of computers. and in people's minds. According to Claude Levi-
Strauss they are realized in myths. Despite this diversity in realization. an 
understanding of a formal system only requires that one understand 
structural rules which are internal to the system. 
The last key concept of this section is that of a differential system. 
Again formal systems are a good illustration. We saw that these systems 
display great diversity in their realization. This prompts the question: 
what makes something a particular element of such a system? In all the 
differently realized instances of. say. a simple predicate calculus. 
construed as an uninterrupted formal system. what determines that all the 
"Ex'''s are the same part of the system? The answer is that this is a 
differential system. a system in which elements have no independent. 
positive identify or status. but get their identity from their relations to the 
rest of the system. The elements of such a system are: 
... defined not by their positive content but negatively by their 
relations with the other terms of the system. Their most precise 
characteristic is being what the others are not. 
What makes something the Ietter"f. to use Saussure's example. is just 
that it is distinct from the other letters. A "f can be on a page. on a screen. 
or in a sequence of short and long flashes or beeps. as long as it is known 
not to be an "a'. not to be a '[). etc. These are systems in which there are 
differences 'l\'i!l101/1 I)olilir(' 1('1"11/1". 
Ferdinand de Saussure. COlli"\(, ill (i('//('rai Lillglll\lin. intr. 1. Culler. London. 1974. 117-20. 
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In summary, what makes a system autonomous is the fact that 
understanding it requires finding principles which make reference only to 
items internal to the system, and what makes a system differential is the 
fact that the identity of an element of the system is a matter purely of its 
relations to other elements. The notion of an autonomous differential 
system is the central theoretical idea in structuralism, as far as I can see. 
The structuralist methodology in social science is, centrally, the location 
and description of autonomous differential systems. 
Saussure's favorite, and now famous, example of an autonomous 
differential system is the game of chess. Almost anything, no matter what 
material. can be used to play chess. Chess is a form, not a substance. 
Chess is autonomous, in that to understand the game it is sufficient to 
know the principles of chess only, principles which make reference only 
to the (differentially identified) elements of the chess system. Notions like 
'check' and 'castling' are defined purely relation ally, and by internal 
relations only. Chess, like language, has syntagmatic and paradigmatic 
dimensions. It is syntagmatic in that a game unfolds linearly, through 
time, and this progression is governed by chess's own structural 
principles. Chess is paradigmatic in that each move involves a choice 
between a definite range of admissible alternatives. 
The autonomous and differential nature of systems like chess can be 
well illustrated by looking at examples of things which aren't autonomous 
differential systems. Saussure uses the example of suits, and of what 
determines the identity of a suit - 'Here we have a material entity that 
consists solely of the inert substance ... Another suit would not be mine 
regardless of its similarity to it'.-' A more sophisticated example, this time 
of a genuine system which is not autonomous and differential. would be 
the system of chemical elements, and the periodic table. To a non-chemist 
like myself. this system can initially look like an autonomous differential 
system. But what makes something an atom of hydrogen, or sodium, is 
not its relation to the rest of the system, it's what it is made of. Hydrogen 
atoms have one electron and one proton, and we don't need to take the 
other elements into account at all. Unlike an autonomous differential 
system, new elements can be - and have been - added to the system 
without affecting the identity of the other elements. This can't happen to 
an autonomous differential system: one can't put new pieces, or new 
squares, on a chessboard and leave the original system intact. 
We will now look at a case in which the structuralist strategy yields 
genuine insight into a complex system. I will also try to show that 
structuralist methods are often most applicable at a somewhat lower level 
of analysis than is often thought. 
3. Ibid .. p.f09.' 
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III - Music 
One of the surpnsmg things about structuralism is the fact that 
although Saussure, lakobson, Barthes and the rest didn't seem to intend 
this, and although it still doesn't seem to be fully appreciated, almost all 
the central claims structuralism makes about language are exactly true of 
most western music. There are plenty of uses of musical analogies in the 
structuralist literature, and concrete analyses of music within the 
structuralist framework But there doesn't seem to be an awareness that 
especially on low levels of description, the classical Saussurian picture of 
language - synchronic/diachronic, langue/parole, syntagmatic/paradigmatic, 
language as form not substance - applies more, in fact, to certain music 
than it does to language. 
This is particularly clear at one of the lowest level systems of music, 
the scale. Almost all western music is based on one of a handful of 
different types of eight-note scale. A lot of twentieth-century music has 
tried to break out of this framework, and there has also been music less 
self-consciously written outside it - notably some American blues. But the 
standard scales, especially the major scale, still form the tonal basis of 
most mainstream western music, both serious and popular. So let us now 
ask: what is a major scale? A major scale is this: 
(tonic) 
~st~2nd~3rd ~4th~5th---:'6th ~7th~8th 
T T ST T T T ST 
A major scale is a pattern of relations. You can start on any note (any 
frequency) at alL and if you build up the successive notes according to the 
pattern above, the result is a major scale. T (tone) and 'ST (semitone) 
designate units of difference between notes. The T gap is twice as big as 
the 'ST gap. The pattern can be realized by many series of notes: 
c. 0, E, F, G, A B. C. 
F#. G#. A#. B#. C#. 0#. E#. F# 
Bi> C. 0, P, F, G A BI>, 
- all they have to do is fit the pattern. 
The major scale is an explanatorily important structure, because the 
pattern is psychologically salient. All major scales have a distinctive 
sound. The vast majority of people couldn't tell you which major scales 
26 
they hear, though many could identify the distinctive major pattern. Ifwe 
want to understand how music operates and affects us, it is not the 
particular notes, the particular frequencies that matter, but the relations 
between them. 
This is true when we view music at higher levels, as well: at the levels 
of the chord sequence and the tune. Two instances of the tune 'St. James 
Infirmary' can have entirely different notes in them. What makes them 
the same tune is the fact that the mathematical relations between the 
notes are the same: 
St. James Infirmary in 0 minor 
St. James Infirmary in F# minor 
Here is the real transcription of ·St. James Infirmary', the pure pattern of 
relations laid bare: 
J 
-
..\, .I J 
tonic, 4th, 5th'l minor 3rd, tonic, ... etc. 
This is the 'deep structur'e of'St. James Infirmary'. Whatever note you 
start on becomes the tonic, and the other notes are specified in terms of 
their mathematical relations to the first. 
Music has a paradigmatic dimension in that the significance of each 
actual note in this tune is a matter of its relations to the other possible 
notes that weren't chosen. If you are told that the second note of a tune is 
an F, without being told what key the tune is in, you know nothing about 
how that note works in the tune. If you are then told that the tune is in 0, 
you can work out what the F is doing: it's a minor 3rd, and will most likely 
give a 'sad', characteristically minor, sound to the first phrase. But you 
don't need to know the actual notes to know this. If you are told that the 
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second note is a minor 3rd, or that the second note is three semi tones 
above the tonic, you can know how it will sound, whatever key the piece is 
in. And if you want to analyze what the second note is doing, you go 
about this analysis by contrasting the actual note, the minor 3rd, to the 
other possible notes that could have taken its place. You contrast it to 
alternatives specified in terms of their relations to the tonic. 
IV - Systems with Hooks 
One of the more important mistakes of the structuralist movement is 
the tendency to assume that its success in linguistics and anthropology 
assures that everYThing is an autonomous differential system. This mistake 
seems to be behind structuralism's frequent excursions into metaphysics. 
For instance, 
[Structuralism! claims that the nature of every element in any 
given situation has no significance by itself. and in fact is 
determined by its relationship to all the other elements 
involved in the situation. In short the full significance of any 
entity or experience cannot be perceived until it is integrated 
into the sTruCTure of which it forms a part. 4 
According to Hawkes, the structuralist achievement in certain social 
sciences shows that everything must now be understood on that sort of 
model. People like Saussure are supposed to have hit on a universal 
feature of reality - ' ... the nature of every element in any given situation .. :. 
But what reason is there for thinking this? Why should success in 
linguistics and literary studies have anything to do with the other sciences 
and the nature of reality? I have encountered some structuralists who 
have rejected Hawkes' ideas on this point. They regard him as an 
overenthusiastic and oversimplifying commentator, and propose a more 
limited domain for structuralism's application. This view is more 
plausible, but many semioticians must reject it because were they to 
accept this, they would have to turn in their licence to practise 
metaphysics. Clearly, for the claim that structuralism vindicates some 
relativistic metaphysics to have any chance of being true, structuralism 
must be applicable to more than the social sciences. 
We have already seen that chemistry, at least of the 'natural' or 'hard' 
sciences, seems to be the very opposite of an autonomous ditTerential 
system. The same seems true of the bulk of physics. Reference is often 
made to twentieth century physics as a vindication of the structuralist 
outlook. 5 I can't imagine how this is supposed to work. Even granting 
4. Hawkes. p.IK 
5. Ibid. p.17. 
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that Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, Belrs Theorem, or the Two-Slit 
Experiment may have some metaphysical - even anti-realist or relativist-
ramifications, it is hard to see how the particular structuralist way into 
these positions is aided by the physical results. Quantum mechanics is 
not a language-like or semiological system. The Two-Slit Experiment 
may be an odd thing but the electrons or photons and the crystal 
apparatus used in it are nothing like elements of an autonomous 
differential system. There are no subatomic syntagms, in any 
explanatorily useful sense. So even if modem physics is a route to some 
metaphysical position, this has nothing to do with semiotics. 
So it is hard to see how structuralism could have the kind of universal 
application required for it to have metaphysical consequences. The 
general place of the structuralist strategy within the sciences is plausibly 
located by Devitt and Sterelny: 
The relational view of the world has some plausibility in 
linguistics and in the social sciences in general. It is 
reasonable to think for instance, that in economic explanations 
we should abstract from the nature of particular capitalists 
and workers. focussing instead on the relations between them 
imposed by the capitalist system. But what about the world of 
the natural sciences. the I/{/fllm! world? The world of stones. 
trees. cats and so on cannot be merely relational. Indeed. it is 
this natural world of objects - particularly people and their 
output - that stand in the relations that are the focus of those 
social sciences. 6 
Probably. there are lots of phenomena where the structuralist strategy 
has next to no application. The accompanying deflation of structuralism's 
metaphysical pretensions is important. 
The rest of this essay is more concerned with a kind of system which is 
something of a hybrid. neith'er purely autonomous and differential (like 
chess). nor purely non-relational (like chemistry). In cases of this sort. 
internal relations are one important factor in determining how the system 
works. but there are also important links between elements of the system 
and the things outside it. A particularly clear case of a hybrid is the money 
system. The next section argues that language is also a system of this type. 
What is it to be an Australian dollar? What is an Australian dollar 
worth? How can we best investigate how Australian dollars operate in our 
lives? Clearly. part of our strategy for answering these (extremely 
6. M.Devitt and K Stcrdny. Llll/gl/IIg(' III/(/ R(,lIlin·. Oxford. 1987. p.219. 
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important) questions will involve looking beyond dollars as concrete, 
material objects to the role of dollars in a complex system. We will then 
find ourselves looking to the internal relations between elements of the 
system; we learn something about the place of the dollar when we learn 
that it is equal in value to 100 cents, for instance, and we learn something 
about both these notions when we learn that it is equal to $0.64 American 
dollars, Clearly, facts like $1 = 100(): are essential to the concept of a dollar. 
If $1 =500(): then we are using either 'dollar' or 'cent' in a new sense. If we 
change this sort of feature of the relations between elements of the money 
system. the elements themselves change. Part of the identity and value of 
parts of the money systems. like the identity of the elements of chess. is 
comprised by internal relations. 
But the account of the dollar in terms of relations to the rest of the 
money system is not the whole story. Dollars have links to things outside 
the system as well. The 'value' of a dollar is not exhausted by its relations 
to other money units. it also depends on its relations to bread. beer. and 
labour. If yo~ want to understand how dollars operate in social life you 
need to know what a dollar can buy. In exactly the same sense that 
external relations are unnecessary for knowledge of pawns. nouns. and 
chords. external relations are necessary for an understanding of money. 7 
These hybrid systems have internal structure. but they are systems 
with hooks. attached to the world outside. 
v - Language and the World 
According to structuralism. all the central aspects of language are best 
analyzed on the autonomous differential system model. Language is an 
autonomous differential system with respect to its phonetics. syntax. and 
semantics. Thus. the phonetic differences that comprise phonemic 
differences are arbitrary and relationally defined. With syntax. what 
makes something a noun. for instance. is how it relates to other sorts of 
words; nouns are what combine with verbs in certain ways. With 
semantics, the meaning of a word is purely a matter of internal relations -
its links to other words within the linguistic system. The application of the 
structuralist strategy to semantics is a rejection of the referential view of 
language. the view that language has explanatorily important links to 
extra-linguistic entities. 
7. Jacques Derrida. O(Grammat%gy. tr. G.c. Spivak. Baltimore. 1976. p.57 quotes a passage 
from the structuralist linguist Hjelmslev which is close to this application of the money 
example. although a different moral is drawn. 
30 
With respect to phonetics, structuralism seems to have been a success. 
It was the strategy behind the development of the successful 'binary 
feature analysis' in phonemics. The bulk of transformational-generative 
grammar has also been carried out under the structuralist banner. 
Structuralism seems at least partly the right approach to these two fields. 
But the study of semantics is importantly independent of phonetics and 
grammar. There is no inconsistency in accepting the structuralist 
approach to phonetics but rejecting its semantics. Systems can 'realise' or 
'underly' systems of quite different kinds. We can ask independently of 
all phonetic and syntactic questions whether language, from the semantic 
perspective, is an autonomous differential system or not. 
The rejection of objective referential links between words and the 
world - or at least a downgrading and disregarding of them - is explicit 
from the foundations of semiotics. 
Some people regard language. when reduced to its elements, 
as a naming process only - a list of words, each corresponding 
to the thing that it names .... This conception is open to 
criticism at several points. ~ 
This idea has continued to be a prominent feature of structuralist 
approaches to language. And the recent demise of many central features 
of structuralism has not seen any change of mind on this point; Derrida 
and (late) Barthes are just as hostile to referential relations as Saussure 
was. I will locate five different reasons for semiotics' denial of reference. 
(/) No Need First of all, the structuralist may argue that there is no 
need to bring in referential relations when explaining how language 
works. According to the Saussurian, the meaning of a word is perfectly 
well explained by looking to its paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, 
and considerations of parsimony are then ample reason for rejecting 
reference. As Hawkes put it: 
The word 'dog' exists, and functions within the structure of the 
English Language, without reference to any four-legged 
barking creature's real existence 9. 
will reply to this charge below. 
(!) Sl/sjlecT Plych%gy. According to Saussure, the referential view of 
language comes in a package with some implausible psychological 
X. Saussurc. p.65 (part I. Chapter I. Section I). 
9. Hawkes. p.17. 
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assumptions: 'It assumes that ready-made ideas exist before words', when, 
rather, 'our thought - apart from its expression in words - is only a 
shapeless and indistinct mass .... There are no pre-existing ideas, and 
nothing is distinct before the appearance of language: 10 
This charge can be handled more quickly. There is no reason at all 
why the referential view of language should make these assumptions. 
Indeed, many current referential theories oflanguage accept the idea that 
thought is carried out in a language-like code. Formulae of the inner code 
are the initial bearers of semantic properties, and public language 
sentences derive their reference from those. II 
(3) DCl7ial of" Singlilar Terllls. Somewhat more obscurely, some have 
denied that there exist such things as singular terms. The referential view 
of language doesn't strictly need there to be singular terms (on Russell's 
theory, for instance, singular reference is reduced to general). But it 
certainly goes most naturally with the view that there are. A singular term 
is a word or expression that refers to one thing only: one person, one 
object one event. Theories of singular terms are these days often the 
foundations - and always the paradigm and least problematic case - for 
theories of reference 12. Singular terms are also important to issues 
concerning translation. 
One encounters the denial of singular terms in lakobson, for instance: 
Pierce's semiotic doctrine is the only sound basis for a strictly 
linguistic semantics. One can't help but agree with his view of 
meaning as translatability of a sign into a network of other 
signs and with his reiterated emphasis on the inherence of 
'general meaning' in any 'genuine symbol... A symbol cannot 
indicate any particular thing: It denotes a kind of thing .. :, 
(Collcctcd Papi!rI 2.301). 
According to lakobson, even a proper name has fundamentally a general 
meaning. 'Napoleon' looks as if it refers to one determinate person, but in 
fact we could use it to denote anyone of a number of stages in a life. and 
without context determining which stage is meant the name is at bOllom 
a general term, 'encompassing all the stages of his life and fate'. 13 
to Saussure. p.57. 111-l2. 
II. See S. Schiffer. Truth and the Theory of Content". M(,(/ilillg (/1/(/ ('IIc/e/"ll(///(lillg ed. Parnet 
and Bouverese. Berlin. 1981. 
12. See M.Devitt. De\·/:~lJ(lIi()ll. New York.. 1981. 
13. Roman Jakobson. "Metalanguage as a Linguistic Problem'. 7/w Fmll/('Iro,." o/l.(/Ilgl/(/g('. 
Ann Arbor. 1980. 87·88. 
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But this is implausible. The fact that Napoleon's life had a number of 
stages is no reason at all for saying that 'Napoleon' can't refer to the one 
person, who had a rather varied life. And 1akobson's view has unwelcome 
consequences. These 'stages' which are supposed to comprise the 
meaning of 'Napoleon' are contingent ieatures of Napoleon's lite. It is quite 
coherent to say 'Napoleon possibly could have lost Austerlitz', even that 
he could have died young, and gone on to do none of the things he is in 
fact famous for. The best explanation of why such statements are 
coherent is the view that 'Napoleon' refers to a single person, and this 
reference is independent of things like who won Austerlitz. But on 
1akobson's view, where these sorts of events comprise the meaning of 
'Napoleon', such statements of possibility come out as nonsense. I can see 
no reason for the rejection of the idea of a singular term. 
(4) 11I1/wI1i'cr ha/ll'/ariol/. One very often hears the idea that if the 
referential view of language were correct. there would be perfect 
translation across languages, whereas in fact the Eskimos have some 
astonishing number of words for 'snow', and the French have words for 
incomprehensibly subtle sorts of pleasure. and so forth. But this is no real 
problem either. The referential view can accommodate the idea that 
different languages group things into kinds differently, causing difficulty 
translating kind terms across languages. The problems for referential 
semantics only arise if singular terms are hard to translate. But in fact 
fewer problems seem to arise here: certainly the most notorious examples 
of translation difficulties all involve general terms. 
(5)1rhilmril/ell al/d Naire Vielt'S o/Re/i'l'('l/ce. This final idea is the most 
important one. 14 Semioticians seem to think that the arhirmn' nature of 
the sign tells against reference. 1ameson. in a revealing quote. says that the 
structuralist picture of signs as arbitrary composites of signifiers and 
signitieds 
strikes down ... the apprehension of language as names and 
naming. There can no longer be any question of such an 
intrinsic relationship once the utterly arbitrary nature of 
language has been made clear. 15 
According to Devitt and Sterelny. the word 'intrinsic' is the clue here. 
Arbitrariness only tells against reference if reference is some necessary. 
acontextual. natural or picturing relationship. If reference had to be some 
such relation. then it does indeed presuppose that the signifier/signified 
14. My discussion here is indebted to Devitt and Stcrdny. op. cit. 
IS. F. JanlC'son. 111(' 11ri,'oll-fiml"l' oj" l.ul/glltlge, Princeton. 1l)72. pJO. 
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pairing is not arbitrary. And structuralists seem to assume that this is what 
reference must be. So language's undeniable arbitrariness makes such 
relations impossible. We are left with paradigmatic and syntagmatic -
internal - relations between words as the sole determinants of semantic 
properties. 
But this is entirely mistaken. There is no reason why reference must be 
a necessary, acontextuaL magical. or resemblance relation. Look again at 
the money system. The sorts of links language has to objects are similar to 
the links money has to what it buys. There is no necessary natural. or 
picturing relation between $1.10 and a packet offettuccini $1.10 has no 
fettuccini-lik~ qualities. Nevertheless, as a matter of economic fact $1.1 0 
and fettuccini are linked in important ways. The link is contingent and 
contextual. but essential for an understanding of the economic system. 
Money is a system linked to labour, to resources, to a great diversity of 
goods and services. The links are complex. but entirely un mysterious. 
Similarly, language is linked with extra-linguistic things. The links are 
contextual. contingent, and have nothing to do with fitness or picturing, 
but as a matter of social fact, they're there in the world. 
The analogy between the hybrid systems of money and of language is 
not supposed to be complete. The 'internal structure' of the money system 
has none of the complexity of that of the language system - which is 
probably why no one mistakes the internal structure of the money system 
for the whole story about money. But the analogy is better in key respects 
than the famous chess example. Chess is a game, something we do just for 
fun. A chess move, on its own, has no great ramilications outside the 
world of chess. But language, and money, are very different to this. 
They're not just games. The movements of money are of huge signilicance 
to the world outside the money-system. Similarly, the use of language is 
causally potent in the extra-linguistic world. Very probably, reference is 
exactly the feature of language that is responsible for the role language 
plays in social life. It is the capacity of language to be about things that 
enables it to figure in the history of those things. In recent decades 
pressure groups have sought to alter the words colloquially used to refer to 
people like negroes and homosexuals from words like "nigger'. "faggot'. 
etc. to less derogatory ones. The use of the derogatory words was alleged to 
have various adverse causal effects on the communities in question. What 
was all that fuss - and current fuss over non-sexist vocabulary - supposed 
to be about, if there are no referential links between words and things? 
Surely this is a clear case of attention being focussed on exactly the sorts 
of word/world links I have been talking about. Minorities were being 
affected by the words used to talk about them. The autonomous 
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differential system model completely fails to account for this aspect of 
language. On retlection. it seems downright bizarre that contemporary 
semiotics. a field seeking to enquire into the social role played by 
language and other signs. into the effects language has on our lives. 
should continue to disparage and disregard the reference relation. It is as 
if a Marxist economist sought to sever the money system from labour. 
And there are other positive reasons for looking for a theory of 
reference. All proper names have the same paradigmatic and syntagmatic 
relations to other words. but all proper names don't mean the same thing. 
No doubt the differences between them are (partly) referential. Further. 
the holism rcsulti'1g from the structuralist model causes problems with 
the explanation oflanguage-acquisition and lexical change. as Devitt and 
Sterelny argue. 16 Language-acquisition is a cumulative process. whereby 
a child starts out (somehow) with a basic vocabulary and syntax and 
builds on these. while continuing to speak the same language. But holistic 
systems don't <;tay the same system across changes of this sort. Vocabulary 
items arc not held constant when new words are learned. The same 
problems arise with lexical change. We cannot say. for instance. that one 
language borrows a word from another to fill a gap in the language -
autonomous systems don't contain 'gaps'. Nor can we say that as the new 
word enters the language-system. all the other elements would necessarily 
change. All this seems very unlikely. 
The structuralist rejection of reference is. then, unwarranted and 
counter-productive. Language is most plausibly viewed as a hybrid 
system analogous to money. It is a system with rich internal structure, 
structure which does contribute to the identity and meaning of words. But 
words also have links to extra-linguistic things. Words are the bearers of 
reference. 
VI - Semiotics Naturalized 
What remains is some discussion of the sorts of factors which could 
comprise the reference relation, and then of what semiotics would look 
like if it acknowledged reference and reference-type links between 
language and other systems and the world. 
I have suggested that the relation of reference is a contingent one not 
based on any necessary fitness or resemblance. The most promising 
current attempt to explain this relation is with causal theories of reference. 
16. Devitt alIL! Stcrclny. rr. ~!.1-IK 
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These theories see the causal links stretching from an object through the 
perceptions and thoughts of speakers, to a sign, as the links that 
determine semantic properties. 17. There has been a convergence between 
one version of the causal theory and an important aspect of structuralist 
thinking. F. Dretske, in his KIIIII\'lc(f~c (/Ild Ill(' FIOl\' o/lll/i!l'lIl(/lioll (Oxford, 
1981), explains semantic properties in terms of a complex quasi-causal 
relation called an 'informational' relation. According to Dretske, anything 
in the world which has a determinate range of possible outcomes is a 
source of information. A dice is a simple example. If you can tell which of 
the possible outcomes at a source is the actual outcome, by inspecting 
some other object which also has a range of possible states, then this 
second thing is a channel of information, or message, about the source. 
The way the correlation between the message and the source is defined by 
Dretske is epistemic: a written note is a message about what's happened 
in the next room if you can telI from the note what's in the room, if the 
actual state of the note reduces the possibilities in the next room to one. 
But when filled out the 'informational' relation is essentialIy causal: the 
state of the note is caused by the actual state of atfairs in the next room. 
That sketch is barely even the bones of Dretske's theory, which is an 
intricate apparatus, with complex kinds of circularity threatening at every 
stage. The point is this. Dretske, alone among the new wave of naturalistic 
semantic theorists (Field, Fodor. Devitt Stampe, Putnam, Searle ... ) puts 
as the keystone of his theory the idea of information as the reduction of 
possibilities. This is something semiotics has been saying tar seventy 
years - that a sign has meaning because of the other signs that could have 
been used, but weren't. This is the idea of Saussure's paradigmatic 
relations, lakobson's metaphorical mode, and alI the other notions along 
this line. According to Saussure, the function of 'hungry' in the sentence 
'I'm hungry' is a matter of its relations to other words that could possibly 
have appeared after the 'I'm': 'thirsty', 'tired', 'happy', etc. But tar Dretske 
the reduction of possibilities that determines content occurs outside the 
linguistic system, at the source. 'I'm hungry' has meaning because it 
enables you to tell which of the possible states of the referent is the actual 
one. It reduces possibilities at some point outside of language. This is a 
major difference. But the similarity is important as welI: Dretske's extra-
linguistic reduction of possibilities is correlated with a reduction of 
possibilities inside language. The 'internal' part of Dretske's theory, the 
reduction of possibilties at the 'channel'. may welI be pure Saussure. It is 
17. See S. Kripke. ;VUI/Ill/g UI/d ,\'<""'\I/Ii', OXI(lrd. 19~(): H. Putnam. Th~ M~aning or 
-Meaning": :V/II/(/. l.ul/glluge ul/d R,'u!u;' (coIl. pap~rs vol. :'1. Cambridg~. 1975: [)~\itt. 
De\/:~'ltl'i()II. 
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just that Dretske's internal reduction of possibilities is correlated with 
external facts. 
Dretske's theory IS also important because existing parts of 
structuralist research can be restated, or reconstrued, in his terms. I 
denied autonomy in the case of language; perhaps there are other systems 
which have come under semiological scrutiny which aren't autonomous, 
which are better seen as hybrids like language and money. Perhaps some 
of the arguments of the last section have a wider application than I have 
given them. IX Dretske's theory enables a sort of translation of particular 
structuralist analyses into a conceptual framework that doesn't require 
that systems be explanatorily autonomous. Barthes' early work on 
fashion, menus and soap powder. for instance, is an example. Consider 
clothes. With respect to some aspects of clothes, the wearer isn't presented 
with an unconstrained choice. Shoe material is an example - it can't be 
tissue paper. But shoe colour is different there are no constraints. We can 
then say, after Dretske, that shoe colour is a source of information. It can 
tell you about the wearer. If a businessman's shoes are not-black-not-
brown but pink. this says something. What's more, what it says depends 
on what else he's wearing. Just as for Barthes, shoe colour could signify 
via its relations (syntagmatic) with the rest of the outfit and relations 
(paradigmatic) with the other possible shoe colours: for Dretske too, shoe 
colour, taken in total costumic context tells us about the wearer. The 
reduction of possible shoe colours to one actual one reduces. because of 
causal relations. the range of possible states of the wearer. At each point in 
an outfit where there is a range of possibilities, a relatively unconstrained 
choice (in the sense discussed above) there is a message which tells us 
about the reduction of possibilities at the source, the states of the wearer 
responsible for the choice. The way the haircuts of Romans in films 
signify 'Roman-ness' 19 is a matter of the other haircuts the actors could 
have had, and the way this enables you to tell their Roman-ness (rather 
than Greekness, Africanness. and so on). Many early Barthian analyses -
at least. the sensible ones - can be restated in Dretskian terms. Very likely 
this applies to a great deal of the classically structuralist work in semiotics. 
Discarding the obsession with autonomous and self-regulating systems 
need not affect the basic spilit and goal of the structuralist enterprise, 
though it is a big break from what is usually said about it. 20 
I~. Jamcson. op. cit.. 109-1111. hint> al Ihis. 
19. Rol'lI1d BaI1hcs.l/rril"I,,~,,·\ tr. lawrs. London. 197.1. 211-,. 
20. I tl\IL' Ihanks 10 Brucc (jardinL'r. Michacl DL'Iill and !-iona Ctl\\TiL' 1(lr hcll'l·ul discussions 
on thL'S\.' ll1<1tll'r~. 
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